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## After two years of waiting: a thorny dilemma

Ercros (ECR) is an industrial group manufacturing chemical products that operates through 3 divisions: (i) basic chemicals, (ii) intermediate chemicals and (iii) pharmaceuticals. The core activity is the production of chlorine-caustic soda, ECR being the main producer in Spain (60% of total installed capacity) and among the top 10 at the European level.

### Market Data

Market Cap (Mn EUR and USD)	295.3	348.9
EV (Mn EUR and USD) <sup>(2)</sup>	419.6	495.8
Shares Outstanding (Mn)	91.4	
-12m (Max/Med/Min EUR)	3.47 / 3.03 / 2.24	
Daily Avg volume (-12m Mn EUR)	0.30	
Rotation <sup>(3)</sup>	26.1	
Refinitiv / Bloomberg	ECR.MC / ECR.SM	
Close fiscal year	31-Dec	

### Shareholders Structure (%)<sup>(7)</sup>

Víctor Manuel Rodríguez Martín	6.3
Joan Casas Galofré	6.0
Dimensional Fund Advisors, L.P.	4.9
Montserrat García Pruns	4.2
Free Float	72.7

Financials (Mn EUR)	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e
Adj. nº shares (Mn)	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.4
Total Revenues	659.9	662.8	715.7	808.9
Rec. EBITDA	5.9	16.9	28.8	52.3
% growth	-78.7	185.8	70.1	81.3
% Rec. EBITDA/Rev.	0.9	2.6	4.0	6.5
% Inc. EBITDA sector <sup>(4)</sup>	6.7	0.8	5.8	4.5
Net Profit	-53.6	-22.6	-15.6	0.5
EPS (EUR)	-0.59	-0.25	-0.17	0.01
% growth	-359.6	57.7	31.0	103.2
Ord. EPS (EUR)	-0.42	-0.33	-0.23	0.01
% growth	-197.7	22.0	31.0	102.4
Rec. Free Cash Flow <sup>(5)</sup>	-4.5	-37.1	-30.2	-10.7
Pay-out (%)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DPS (EUR)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Net financial debt	112.9	150.0	180.1	190.8
ND/Rec. EBITDA (x)	19.0	8.8	6.2	3.7
ROE (%)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.2
ROCE (%) <sup>(5)</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.0

### Ratios & Multiples (x)<sup>(6)</sup>

P/E	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Ord. P/E	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
P/BV	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2
Dividend Yield (%)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
EV/Sales	0.64	0.63	0.59	0.52
EV/Rec. EBITDA	n.a.	24.8	14.6	8.0
EV/EBIT	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	22.8
FCF Yield (%) <sup>(5)</sup>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

**2025 RESULTS: SEVERE CYCLICAL TROUGH.** 2025 revenue of EUR 659.9 Mn (-4.8% vs. 2024). Sales volume fell to 910 thousand tons (-3% vs. 2024; c. -30% vs. 2019), with declines across all divisions. Rec. EBITDA dropped to EUR 5.9 Mn (-78.7% vs. 2024), reflecting margin pressure amid still-high energy costs and very weak end-demand. Net debt (ex-IFRS 16) decreased to EUR 112.9 Mn (-5.6% vs. 2024).

**WEAK EUROPEAN CHEMICAL SECTOR AND DETERIORATING CONSENSUS.** The environment is impacted by subdued demand (construction and automotive), global competitive pressure (China), and a structural cost disadvantage in Europe (energy/regulation). While signs of capacity rationalization are emerging, recovery depends on the revival of the European industrial cycle, with low visibility for 2026. This deterioration is reflected in the sector index performance (-2y: c.-6%) and consensus downgrades for peers (-2y FY2026 EBITDA: -29%).

**ESTIMATES: LIMITED VISIBILITY; 2026E POINTS TO A 4TH YEAR OF DOWN-CYCLE.** Driven by still-moderate end-demand. With volumes and prices still contained and some improvement in energy costs, we estimate 2026e Recurring EBITDA of EUR 16.9 Mn (2.6% margin). For 2027e-2028e, we estimate a gradual recovery (initially via volumes and later via prices), though without reaching historical averages within the 26e-28e period. Expected FCF <0, with ND increasing through (at least) 2028e.

**TAKEOVER BID (OPA): FINAL PHASE AND KEY CONDITIONS.** The acceptance period ends on Mar-13; the minimum acceptance condition is >50% (lowered from 75%), which Bondalti states it "will not waive under any circumstances." Offer price: EUR 3.505/share (+8,5% vs. today). A squeeze-out requires ≥90%, but 6.2% announced they will not tender. The offer price, set two years ago, has remained unchanged.

**IN CONCLUSION:** After a two-year wait, the Bondalti takeover bid has culminated in a dilemma for ECR shareholders, who must decide now. This dilemma is triggered by the dismal state of the sector, which is now facing its fourth "trough" year, amid the possibility that the European chemical industry may suffer a structural loss of profitability. This report provides a dispassionate analysis of the situation and concludes that, while no option is optimal for the shareholder, the "least-bad" choice is to accept the offer, thereby avoiding a foreseeable slump in the share price. However, the report also concludes that rejecting the offer is not indefensible, provided one recognizes and accepts the significant "tolls" involved (the most obvious being the likely return of the share price to pre-takeover levels). A truly thorny dilemma.

### Relative performance (Base 100)



Stock performance (%)	-1m	-3m	-12m	YTD	-3Y	-5Y
Absolute	-5.7	-2.4	14.9	-5.7	-20.6	33.7
vs Ibex 35	-8.6	-13.0	-16.9	-11.1	-59.7	-40.1
vs Ibex Small Cap Index	-5.1	-5.9	-1.2	-7.5	-36.7	5.5
vs Eurostoxx 50	-7.9	-10.1	2.5	-11.0	-45.1	-20.8
vs Sector benchmark <sup>(4)</sup>	-12.0	-10.2	21.6	-13.5	-19.3	20.9

(1) The opinion regarding the results is on reported EBITDA with respect to our estimate for the year (12m). The impact reflects whether, due to the results, we envisage a significant revision (>5% - 10%, depending on the sector) of our EBITDA estimate (for any of the estimated years).

(2) Please refer to Appendix 3.

(3) Rotation is the % of the capitalisation traded - 12m.

(4) Sector: Stoxx Europe 600 Chemicals.

(5) Please see Appendix 2 for the theoretical tax rate (ROCE) and rec. FCF calculation.

(6) Multiples and ratios calculated over prices at the date of this report.


(7) Others: Montserrat García Pruns 3.6%, Francesc Xavier Casas Galofré 1.2%, Santander Small Caps España 1.0%

(\*) Unless otherwise indicated, all the information contained in this report is based on: The Company, Refinitiv and Lighthouse.

**Bondalti takeover bid complete /  
Results 12m 2025**

**Bondalti's Takeover Bid: What Should Investors Do?**

**Chart 1. STOXX Europe 600 Chemicals Index Performance (100 = 04-Mar-2024)**



Nearly two years since the launch of the takeover bid (March 4, 2024), ECR shareholders currently face a dilemma. Investors can either (i) tender their shares at the offer price of EUR 3.505/share in a context of cyclical weakness for the European chemical industry—and particularly for commodity chemicals (c. 60% of ECR's revenue)—or (ii) maintain their positions, assuming the risk that, should the transaction fail to proceed, the share price could adjust downward in line with the recent sector trend following the deterioration of the European chemical industry outlook.

Over the last two years, ECR's share price has remained largely dictated by the various takeover processes (initially the bid launched by Bondalti and subsequently the emergence of Esseco), showing a significant divergence from the performance of the European chemical sector. In the absence of Bondalti's bid, or should it be withdrawn, a price correction to converge with sector performance cannot be ruled out. This would imply an adjustment of between -25% and -30% vs. current prices (EUR 3.23/share), aligning with the correction seen in European peers over the same period (from March 4, 2024, to the present; Chart 1).

In this context, the objective is—from a position of independence and based on an analysis of ECR's economic-financial reality and the various possible scenarios—to provide investors with an analytical framework to facilitate decision-making.

**2025 results are not yet priced in but demonstrate the extreme weakness of the sector (2025 Recurring EBITDA: -78.7% vs. 2024)...**

ECR's 2025 revenue stood at EUR 659.9 Mn (-4.8% vs. 2024), in line with expectations and reflecting the persistent weakness of the European chemical sector and commodity chemicals in particular.

The year's performance was marked by volume declines across all divisions (-0.3% in Chlorine Derivatives, -9.7% in Intermediate Chemistry, and -7.7% in Pharma). Overall, total volume sold fell -3% vs. 2024 (to 910 thousand tons), remaining well below pre-pandemic levels (c. -30% vs. 2019) and the peak of the previous cycle (-18% vs. 2022).


In terms of pricing, the environment remains weak due to lower demand (-4.5% in Chlorine Derivatives, 0% in Intermediate Chemistry, and +4.5% in Pharma). The average price per ton decreased for the third consecutive year (-3.3% vs. 2024), accumulating a decline of c. -27% since the peaks reached in 2022 (at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine).

In this context, Recurring EBITDA dropped to EUR 5.9 Mn (-78.7% vs. 2024), reflecting persistent margin pressure amid still-high energy costs and very weak end-demand. The year-over-year EBITDA variance is primarily explained by (i) lower selling prices and (ii) falling volumes, in a context where total variable costs (procurement and supplies) remained stable. This contracted the Recurring EBITDA margin to 0.9% (vs. 4% in 2024 and an 8.8% average for 2019-2024).

Despite the performance of Recurring EBITDA and the CAPEX undertaken during the period (EUR 29.2 Mn), Net Debt (ex-IFRS 16) decreased to EUR 112.9 Mn (-5.6% vs. 2024) at year-end 2025. This was mainly due to (i) a reduction in operating working capital and (ii) the collection of a tax refund (EUR 19.8 Mn). Nonetheless, at year-end 2025, ECR was in breach of certain financial covenants (including ND/EBITDA <3.5x), although it obtained waivers in 2024 and 2025. In this context, the ND/Recurring EBITDA ratio stands at c. 19x, while ND/Equity remains at c. 0.4x (levels comparable to the sector).

Overall, there is strong pressure on volumes, prices, and margins stemming from the current "oversupply" situation. In this environment, ECR expects a recovery in demand (first in volumes and subsequently in prices) during 2H26, although this is subject to a "reasonable resolution of the current tariff crisis and the implementation of the European Chemical Industry Support

**Chart 2. Product volumes sold by ECR**




**Chart 3. Average selling price (EUR/Tn) – ECR**




Plan." This implies that the visibility of a possible recovery in 2026 is very low. As of the date of this report, such a recovery has not yet begun.

**Chart 4. Euro Zone Production, Chemicals products, Index, 2021=100**



**Chart 5. EU27 capacity utilization: chemicals**




Fuente: Cefic

**Chart 6. EU27 chemical consumption (EUR Bn)**



Fuente: Cefic

**Chart 7. Natural gas prices: Europe vs USA (EUR/MWh)**



Fuente: Cefic

**Table 1. 2025 Results**

EUR Mn	12m25	12m24	12m25 vs
			12m24
<b>Total Revenues</b>	<b>659.9</b>	<b>692.8</b>	<b>-4.8%</b>
Chlorine derivatives	390.6	410.2	-4.8%
Intermediate chemicals	175.8	194.6	-9.6%
Pharmaceuticals	60.4	62.6	-3.5%
Other revenues	33.0	25.4	30.1%
<b>Recurrent EBITDA</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>-78.7%</b>
<i>Rec. EBITDA/Revenues</i>	<i>0.9%</i>	<i>4.0%</i>	<i>-3.1 p.p.</i>
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>28.6</b>	<b>-84.7%</b>
<i>EBITDA/Revenues</i>	<i>0.7%</i>	<i>4.1%</i>	<i>-3.5 p.p.</i>
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>-28.1</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
<b>PBT</b>	<b>-40.3</b>	<b>-12.3</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
<b>NP</b>	<b>-53.6</b>	<b>-11.7</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
Tons sold (thousand)	910	938	-3.0%
			<b>12m25 vs</b>
	<b>12m25</b>	<b>12m24</b>	<b>12m24</b>
Net Debt <sup>(1)</sup>	112.9	119.6	-5.6%
ND / rec. EBITDA	19.0 x	4.3 x	

(1) Net Debt adjusted to exclude the impact of IFRS 16.

### The European chemical sector remains weak...

The European chemical industry continues to show a weak tone. Despite the partial normalization of energy costs from 2022 peaks, the context remains conditioned by a combination of moderate end-demand, global competitive pressure (overcapacity and strong capacity entry, primarily from China), and a structural cost disadvantage compared to other regions (mainly energy and environmental regulations).

- European end-demand remains contained, especially in construction and certain durable goods.** The main end-markets for the chlor-alkali complex (particularly those linked to PVC and derivatives for construction) continue to show moderate activity levels in Europe. This translates into European chemical plant utilization rates of c. 75% vs. a historical average of >80% (Chart 5). Additionally, the utilization rate for caustic soda production is below 70% (vs. historical levels >80%).
- Global overcapacity and import pressure.** Beyond the demand cycle, global overcapacity remains a structural drag for Europe. Capacity expansion in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in the U.S. in recent years has increased competitive pressure on European producers. The surge in imports limits price recovery even during cyclical improvement phases (Chart 6).
- European energy costs remain high in relative terms.** Although energy prices have receded from 2022 peaks, Europe maintains a structural disadvantage against regions with access to more competitive energy (e.g., the U.S.). This factor is particularly relevant for the chlor-alkali business (highly electro-intensive) and continues to weigh on its competitiveness (Chart 7). Energy prices today remain higher than in 2019. However, a certain decline in electricity prices in Spain is observed during 2026 (average price: Jan-26 -26% vs. Jan-25 and Feb-26 -85% vs. Feb-25).
- Ongoing industrial rationalization with gradual effects.** The Cefic (European Chemical Industry Council) sector radar shows an acceleration of capacity closure announcements in Europe in recent years (37 Mn tons in 2022-2025, representing c. 9% of European chemical production capacity), concentrated in petrochemicals and basic inorganic chemistry. However, the impact on the supply-demand balance is gradual, given the time lag between closures, new investments, and the European market's import capacity.

In this sense, the European chlor-alkali sector is entering a phase of capacity rationalization. Kem One temporarily suspended chlorine and soda production in

France (Nov-23) due to weak demand and margin pressure; Vynova announced its intention to close its PVC plant in Beek (Jul-25), citing overcapacity and low-cost competition; and INEOS has communicated its intention to close units in Rheinberg (Germany) due to high energy and CO<sub>2</sub> costs. Collectively, the moves by these major operators point to a supply adjustment in Europe in the face of deteriorating spreads and a loss of regional competitiveness.

- **Environmental regulation as a structural headwind.** The European regulatory framework (including the Emissions Trading System and decarbonization targets) continues to act as a background pressure factor for the chemical industry, primarily through its impact on energy costs and industrial investment needs. This results in a relative loss of competitiveness compared to other regions.

In this regard, the entry of the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) into its operational phase in 2026—which introduces new control and reporting requirements for importers—will mark the beginning of effective control. This could progressively affect the competitiveness of imports in the European market.

- **Outlook: Short-term weakness will persist.** Over the next 12-24 months, the recovery of the chemical industry will depend on an improvement in the European industrial cycle (higher demand) and the impact of the European Action Plan for the Chemical Industry (published Jul-25), the effectiveness of which is not expected to be felt until 2H 2026. A sustained improvement in demand, coupled with the effective realization of capacity closures, will be key to a firmer normalization of the sector.

#### **We are revising estimates: Limited visibility. 2026e points to a poor year for the fourth consecutive time.**

The 2025 results confirm that ECR is going through a prolonged cycle trough (2023-2025) and that visibility for recovery remains limited today. We therefore estimate a scenario of continued weakness in 2026e, stemming from still moderate/weak end-demand. Should this materialize, it would mark the fourth consecutive year of a down-cycle (compared to a historical average duration for the chemical cycle of 8 years).

- **Flat revenue in 2026e: EUR 662.8 Mn** (+0.4% vs. 2025), a result of still-weak end-demand (mainly construction and other sectors like automotive) and a pricing context that will remain under pressure. This will translate into flat volumes (still contained, -25% vs. 2019) and prices.

For 2027e-2028e, we estimate a gradual recovery, initially via volumes and subsequently via prices, supported by cycle normalization: an increase in end-demand (construction, durable goods, and automotive, among others), support measures from the European Chemical Industry Plan, and the effect of ongoing industrial rationalization alongside lower CAPEX in Europe.

In this context, we estimate average volume growth for 2027e-2028e of +6%, along with an average price increase of +5%. This would push 2027e revenue to EUR 716 Mn (+8%) and 2028e to EUR 809 Mn (+13%).

- **Increase in 2026e Recurring EBITDA to EUR 17 Mn.** This improvement is derived from a higher gross margin, a consequence of reduced supply costs (Chart 8). In particular, electricity prices (ECR consumes c. 1 Mn MWh/year) show a sharp correction compared to 2025 levels, while the futures curve points to lower prices (c. -5/-10 EUR/MWh vs. six months ago).

However, the combination of still-contained volumes and selling prices and ECR's high operating leverage will continue to pressure Recurring EBITDA, which would point to c. EUR 17 Mn in 2026e (Recurring EBITDA margin of 2.6%).

The forecast for more competitive supply costs (though still above 2019 levels), along with the gradual recovery of volumes and prices, would allow Recurring EBITDA to rise to c. EUR 29 Mn in 2027e (4% margin) and c. EUR 52 Mn in 2028e (6.5% margin),

**Chart 8. OMIE market price**


still well below the historical range of EUR 60–70 Mn recorded in 2019–2024 (c. 8–9% margin).

Our estimates assume volumes remain contained and far from the c. 1,260 tons sold in 2019 (2028e: c. -20% vs. 2019). For 2027e–2028e, we project a gradual recovery in operating profitability, contingent on the evolution of energy and sector utilization levels.

- Continuation of CAPEX (3D Plan + additional investments for competitiveness).** ECR is currently implementing its 3D Plan (Diversification, Digitalization, and Decarbonization). Additionally, ECR is carrying out other investments outside the 3D Plan and recurrently invests in capacity maintenance. Our estimates assume a CAPEX of c. EUR 30 Mn annually for the 2026e–2028e period, in line with ECR's guidance. This implies a CAPEX/Revenue ratio in the 4%–5% range, aligned with historical benchmarks.
- Absence of FCF generation.** The expected EBITDA performance (progressive improvement but at contained levels without reaching historical averages during the 2026e–2028e projected period), combined with maintained CAPEX aimed at improving competitiveness, will significantly weigh on cash generation during 2026e and, to a lesser extent, during 2027e–2028e. Added to this is the burden of financial expenses (c. EUR 13 Mn in 2025), which has increased in recent years due to the rise in net debt over the last three years. However, we project a gradual improvement in 2027e–2028e as the cycle progresses and normalizes.
- Expected increase in leverage.** The projected negative FCF would translate into an increase in Net Debt of c. EUR 35 Mn in 2026e, up to EUR 150 Mn (a 2026e ND/Recurring EBITDA ratio of c. 9x). This is a further reflection of the dismal cycle momentum and would place ECR in breach of its covenants with financial institutions. Nonetheless, given recent precedents, ECR is likely to continue obtaining the corresponding waivers. The fact that ECR's lenders are the same as Bondalti's mitigates, in our view, the risk of short-term financial tension and supports the expectation of obtaining waivers, although it highlights a demanding credit environment.

**Table 2. Revision of Estimates (2026e – 2028e)**

EUR Mn	2026e (New)	Review (%)	2027e (New)	Review (%)	2028e (New)
<b>Total Revenues</b>	<b>662.8</b>	<b>-15.8%</b>	<b>715.7</b>	<b>-10.8%</b>	<b>808.9</b>
<b>Recurrent EBITDA</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>-71.2%</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>-53.6%</b>	<b>52.3</b>
<i>Recurrent EBITDA growth</i>	<i>185.8%</i>	<i>-301.9 p.p.</i>	<i>70.1%</i>	<i>64.8 p.p.</i>	<i>81.3%</i>
<i>Rec. EBITDA/Revenues</i>	<i>2.6%</i>	<i>-4.9 p.p.</i>	<i>4.0%</i>	<i>-3.7 p.p.</i>	<i>6.5%</i>
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>-15.8</b>	<b>-158.3%</b>	<b>-4.5</b>	<b>-114.9%</b>	<b>18.4</b>
<b>Net Profit</b>	<b>-22.6</b>	<b>-234.4%</b>	<b>-15.6</b>	<b>-181.0%</b>	<b>0.5</b>
<b>Recurrent Free Cash Flow</b>	<b>-37.1</b>	<b>-620.9%</b>	<b>-30.2</b>	<b>-369.7%</b>	<b>-10.7</b>
<i>ND / EBITDA</i>	<i>8.8 x</i>	<i>6.6 x</i>	<i>6.2 x</i>	<i>4.2 x</i>	<i>3.7 x</i>

### How do our estimates compare to the European chemical sector consensus?

Since the announcement of Bondalti's takeover bid for ECR (Mar-24), the European chemical sector has shown weak performance. The European sector index (Stoxx Europe 600 Chemicals) has accumulated a decline of c. -6% to the date of this report (Chart 1), reflecting the deterioration of the sector's outlook in a context of weak industrial demand, global overcapacity, increased competitive pressure from non-EU producers, and high energy costs in Europe (both historically and relative to the U.S.).

In this same period, ECR's stock price has shown a very different trend (+26% since the takeover announcement), fundamentally supported by the price and expectations of corporate transactions (Bondalti and Essec). In this context, it is relevant to analyze the evolution of market expectations for the sector.

- Continuous downward revision of estimates by analysts for European listed peers.** The deterioration of the sector environment is clearly reflected in the revisions of analyst estimates for the main European peers (BASF, Solvay, Covestro, and PCC

Rokita). The following charts show the cumulative change in revenue estimates for FY2025–FY2026 since the launch of the takeover bid.

The trend is consistent across companies: revenue forecasts have been progressively revised downward over the last two years. As an illustration, the average revenue estimate for FY2026 currently sits c. -14% below the level estimated in March 2024. This pattern suggests that the adjustment of expectations has been generalized in the European chemical sector since Mar-24 (the date Bondalti’s bid was launched).


**Chart 9. Listed peers: Cumulative consensus revisions since Mar-24 (Revenue).**



- **The same dynamic is observed in terms of EBITDA**, with sharper revisions due to the sector’s high operating leverage. The fixed-cost structure characteristic of the chemical industry amplifies the impact of lower revenue on profitability.

On average, EBITDA estimates for peers show negative revisions of approximately -27% for FY2025 and -29% for FY2026.


**Chart 10. Listed peers: Cumulative consensus revisions since Mar-24 (EBITDA).**



In sum, the evolution of the consensus highlights that the trough of the European chemical cycle has turned out to be much deeper and more prolonged than initially anticipated by the market. After three years of weakness (2023–2025), expectations still point to a gradual recovery, albeit with visibility still limited in the short and medium term (2026-2027).

In this context, Bondalti’s bid values 100% of Ercros’ equity at approximately EUR 320.5 Mn. Considering our estimates, the offer would imply multiples of c. 26x 2026e EV/EBITDA and 15x 2027e EV/EBITDA, compared to 6,7x and 6,0x, respectively, for European peers. Therefore, the offer values ECR’s business above the current sector multiples, reinforcing the idea that, in the absence of a takeover bid, the stock price would likely converge toward levels more aligned with its peers.

**Chart 11. Evolution of ECR price and Bondalti offer price**



**Chart 12. Industrial production index of chemical products in the Eurozone**



**Table 3. Historical performance of ECR**

EUR Mn	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Total Revenues	606.9	689.3	677.1	682.3	579.3	811.8	1,052.5	755.4	692.8	659.9
Total Revenues growth	-2.8%	13.6%	-1.8%	0.8%	-15.1%	40.1%	29.6%	-28.2%	-8.3%	-4.8%
Margen bruto	247.5	256.1	242.0	243.0	230.9	286.3	359.9	260.8	250.0	231.2
Cto. margen bruto	-24.1%	3.5%	-5.5%	0.4%	-5.0%	24.0%	25.7%	-27.6%	-4.1%	-7.5%
Margen bruto /Ingresos	40.8%	37.2%	35.7%	35.6%	39.9%	35.3%	34.2%	34.5%	36.1%	35.0%
EBITDA	58.2	52.6	62.8	56.8	47.3	92.9	121.9	43.3	28.6	4.4
EBITDA growth	79.0%	-9.7%	19.4%	-9.4%	-16.7%	96.3%	31.2%	-64.5%	-34.0%	-84.7%
EBITDA/Sales	9.6%	7.6%	9.3%	8.3%	8.2%	11.4%	11.6%	5.7%	4.1%	0.7%

**Today, everything pivots on the Takeover Bid: Key elements of the prospectus and the Board's report.**

The situation at ECR continues to pivot around the takeover bid formulated by Bondalti, whose structure and conditions are decisive for the short-term analysis of the stock. The offer has specific characteristics, including the stability of the price offered during a period of clear deterioration in the European chemical sector.

Main elements of the offer prospectus (February 6, 2026):

- **Takeover bid for 100% of share capital.** At a price of EUR 3.505/share in cash. This price is not subject to fair price rules, but Bondalti specifies in the bid authorization request that "The Offeror considers that the Offer Price meets the requirements to be considered a 'fair price' in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of Royal Decree 1066/2007..."
- **Acceptance period:** from February 12 to March 13, 2026.
- **Minimum acceptance condition (50%).** The effectiveness of the offer is conditioned on the offeror reaching more than 50% of the effective voting rights, a condition it has stated it will not waive ("The Offeror will in no case waive the minimum acceptance condition of the Offer."). It is worth noting that the initial minimum condition (75%) was very recently lowered to the current 50% level.
- **Intention for delisting:** If the offeror reaches at least 90% of the capital, it plans to exercise the right of compulsory purchase/sale (squeeze-out) and promote the delisting from trading. If this threshold is not reached, the offeror has indicated it will evaluate promoting a delisting tender offer.
- **The offer price has not been submitted for consideration by the CNMV as a "fair price"** in accordance with the fair price rules contained in Article 110 of the LMVSI and Article 9 of Royal Decree 1066/2007. Neither has the CNMV valued said price as suitable for delisting according to the valuation criteria established in Article 10 of Royal Decree 1066/2007. Consequently, we understand that the offeror could not promote delisting through the simplified procedure provided for in Article 65 of the LMVSI without, if applicable, formulating a specific delisting tender offer.

Key highlights from the Board of Directors' Report (February 19, 2026):

- **Unfavorable opinion on the offer issued by the Board of Directors**, approved by majority (not unanimity).
- **The report acknowledges that the offer provides liquidity at a premium** ("the Offer could present a divestment opportunity for the Company's current shareholders seeking to obtain immediate liquidity for their investment at a premium over its current price.").
- **The price has been considered fair by the financial advisor (Evercore)**. "While the Offer Price may be fair... the consideration offered might not fully reflect the Company's intrinsic value and it therefore considers it to have room for improvement."
- **Directors holding c. 6.2% of the capital have expressed their intention not to tender their shares**, reserving the possibility of reconsidering said decision if circumstances change. This reduces the likelihood of the bid reaching the 90% threshold and the squeeze-out being executed.
- **Individual opinion of two directors (without shareholding in ECR)**. (i) Ms. Lourdes Vega (Independent, director since 2016) expresses a favorable opinion of the offer. (ii) Mr. Eduardo Sánchez notes, among other aspects:
  - "The market, at any sign of the takeover process not continuing, has reacted very negatively with approaches to the value reflected by the stock two years ago of EUR 2.5...". In this regard, ECR's stock fell c. -16% on the day the Essec bid was withdrawn (Aug 11, 2025).
  - Financial advisors have issued opinions supporting that the price represents fair value: "The opinion of advisors and regulators should be taken into account and these, particularly the former, after an exhaustive and rigorous analysis, have given signals and opinions supporting the fact that the takeover value is a fair value...";
  - "The limited existence of alternatives... as well as the fact that after numerous market contacts there has been no other offer or interest apart from Essec's, which was withdrawn at the time."

### Scenario tree: High dispersion of options

One way to integrate the various elements of the takeover bid (estimate revisions, sector deterioration, offer conditions, etc.) is through scenario analysis. Objectively, the possible scenarios facing any investor/shareholder in the ECR takeover bid are as follows:



1. **Bondalti does not reach >50% and the offer fails.** In this scenario, ECR would continue as an independent company and the takeover premium would disappear. Given the sector evidence, it is reasonable to think that the price would tend to reflect the fundamental expectations of the "standalone" business once again, in a context where: (i) the European chemical sector has shown a significant deterioration since Mar-24 (c. -6%; Chart 1; with a relative performance vs. Eurostoxx 50 of c. -

25%), (ii) comparable companies like PCC Rokita have recorded significantly higher drops (c. -25%), and (iii) the implied multiples based on our projections are above the sector average.

Under these assumptions, ECR' share price could trend toward levels more aligned with the recent sector performance, with the pre-offer price (EUR 2.56/share) providing a relevant reference point. This would therefore be a scenario with very material theoretical downside for the shareholder.

2. **Bondalti reaches  $\geq 90\%$  in the 1st Takeover Bid.** In this case, Bondalti could exercise the right of compulsory sale (squeeze-out), forcing the remaining shareholders to sell at EUR 3.505/share, provided legal requirements are met. However, ECR's shareholder base is highly fragmented (free float of c. 73%), and c. 6.2% of the capital (held by directors) has expressed its intention not to tender. Consequently, it would only take an additional 3.8% not accepting the offer to prevent the exercise of the squeeze-out.
3. **Bondalti reaches  $>50\%$  but  $<90\%$ .** The premium offered compared to the pre-takeover price (c. +37% vs. the EUR 2.56/share on March 4, 2024), combined with the deterioration of the European chemical sector outlook (especially in basic chemicals) since the offer's launch, objectively reduces the relative attractiveness of maintaining a standalone position in ECR.

Despite the sector being at a low point in the cycle (pointing to a fourth consecutive year of weakness), visibility for a recovery is limited today, and adverse structural factors exist: (i) higher energy costs in Europe (vs. historical levels and other geographies), competitive pressure from Asian capacity, weakness in European industrial demand, and a higher environmental regulatory burden.

In this context, the offer provides an opportunity for immediate liquidity (in the words of ECR's own Board: "the Offer could present a divestment opportunity for the Company's current shareholders seeking to obtain immediate liquidity for their investment at a premium over its current price"), although it implies giving up a potential future upside, which we consider real, but whose visibility today is very low. From here, three possible sub-scenarios emerge:

- a. **ECR remains listed under Bondalti's control.** ECR would become a controlled listed company, likely with (i) a smaller free float and lower liquidity—two factors that penalize valuation—and (ii) greater uncertainty over strategy and financial policy (most notably, dividends). In the prospectus, Bondalti states: "...after the settlement of the Offer, the Offeror will carry out a strategic review process of Ercros (including the 3D Plan) and its group and will promote the preparation of a new strategic plan...". And "The Offeror intends to modify the dividend distribution policy with respect to the current one, reducing them in order to finance Ercros and its group's previously mentioned growing investment needs...". However, this theoretical scenario is in practice incompatible with Bondalti's expressed intention in the prospectus to promote delisting, provided the required price does not exceed that of the current offer.
- b. **Gradual accumulation in the market until  $\geq 90\%$ .** Bondalti could increase its stake through market purchases following the bid. However, it does not seem reasonable to expect significant sales at lower prices from shareholders who did not tender in the first offer.
- c. **Launch of a 2nd (Delisting) Takeover Bid.** In this case, three sub-scenarios would appear:
  - **Tendering for the delisting bid.** The price would have to meet the "fair price" requirement according to applicable regulations and be considered by the CNMV.

However, we highlight that: (i) Bondalti has stated it would only promote delisting if the price does not exceed the current offer, (ii) the offeror considers EUR 3.505/share already meets fairness criteria (supported by a Kroll report), and (iii) the sector environment has deteriorated since the launch. Additionally, the commitments proposed and assumed before the CNMC—following the price setting—reduce Bondalti's potential profitability. These commitments essentially include supplying up to 85k tons/year of hypochlorite to third parties at cost price, under a framework offer supervised by an independent administrator with an initial duration of 5 years (extendable up to 15). Bondalti has estimated the impact of complying with these commitments at c. EUR 3.3 Mn/year.

All this reduces both the probability of a price improvement and its potential magnitude today; although it is theoretically possible. In this regard, we should note that the price of the first bid (EUR 3.505/share) would constitute a very strong benchmark.

- **Not tendering for the delisting bid.** (i) If Bondalti is <90%: ECR could be delisted from trading, with the shareholder remaining as a minority holder, facing significant risks of structural illiquidity and lower transparency...

### Conclusion: the shareholder faces a thorny dilemma—what is the right move?

Now, after a two-year wait, ECR shareholders have reached the end of the tender offer process and face a dilemma. A thorny one. Literally. We use the term "dilemma" in its strictest sense: a situation requiring a choice between two options that are equally favorable—or in this case, unfavorable. Unfortunately, both paths here are equally poor.

Why? Because, in one way or another, the shareholder always loses something. The task is to choose which "toll" is easier to pay.

This report has aimed to present the key elements to consider when deciding whether or not to accept the offer price. These elements consist of six core factors:

- ECR's dismal earnings momentum: Our estimates reflect a 2026 that would extend the "trough" of the last three years, with no positive FCF generation until beyond 2028.
- Poor sector momentum and structural changes: These shifts have led to a significant loss of profitability for European operators. This explains the uniqueness of a cyclical trough entering its fourth year with no clear end in sight.
- The market's reaction: Shares in the sector have been heavily penalized. Analysts have systematically cut estimates, pricing in the deep depression and lack of visibility.
- Specific offer conditions: Notably, the offer price remains unchanged from two years ago (despite the conditions imposed by the CNMC), alongside an unequivocal requirement of 50% acceptance for the offer not to be withdrawn.
- Historical price behavior: ECR's adjusted price history indicates that while there have been scenarios over the last 10 years where the company's FCF generation was better recognized, those moments were rare. It has been difficult to see prices above EUR 3.5/share, and almost never above EUR 4.0/share.
- ECR's excellent track record: The EBITDA series from 2016–2021 (years that can be considered "normal" or "mid-cycle," excluding 2020) offers self-explanatory figures regarding the real earning capacity of ECR's assets and management: reaching an average EBITDA of EUR 62 Mn with an average margin of 9.0%. This is a far cry from the EUR 5,9 Mn obtained in 2025, or our expectation of EUR 17 Mn for 2026 (a 2.6% margin). In other words, the high quality of ECR's assets is currently masked by a combination of factors (depressed demand/pricing and high energy costs) that hide its true bottom-line potential. Bondalti's offer would pay less than 8x EV/EBITDA for these assets.

These are the key arguments to consider, which illustrate the dilemma currently facing Ercros shareholders. In our view, the most critical aspect of this dilemma is the sharp deterioration the sector has experienced over the past two years, the total lack of visibility regarding a recovery (which we do not anticipate until beyond 2028), and, most notably, the possibility—though not the certainty—that the European chemical industry is facing a structural loss of profitability. This would imply a diminished capacity for FCF generation throughout all phases of the cycle and, consequently, a lower intrinsic value.

This point is crucial: the offer price set two years ago (which Bondalti has not adjusted) cannot be judged today by the same standards as back then. In March 2024, there was an expectation of a swift exit from the cyclical trough and a perception of a more profitable sector. Two years later, the context has shifted radically; therefore, the perspective on the offer price must shift as well. Investors cannot ignore this fact.

In this context, what does the ECR shareholder stand to gain or lose?

- If you tender your shares: You escape the sector's dismal outlook at a reasonable price. You take the most rational path: preventing the offer from being withdrawn and avoiding a potential share price collapse of up to -30%, which would send the stock back to "square one" (the pre-takeover price of EUR 2.56/share). However, you pay a toll that cannot be ignored: you forfeit the potential intrinsic value of ECR (driven by asset quality and track record) should it exceed the offer. This forfeit occurs in a grim context: a terrible sector outlook, zero visibility, and the possibility that industry profitability has suffered a structural, permanent decline.
- If you do not tender: You face a very high risk of the offer being withdrawn and the share price plummeting. To make matters worse, the market would likely strip ECR of its "takeover premium," assuming the Bondalti offer (following Essec's withdrawal) was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. In exchange, however, you retain ownership of a high-quality company (which remained EBITDA positive throughout the entire trough) and the possibility of eventually obtaining a price that recognizes its higher intrinsic value—though we have seen that this "higher value" is significantly more uncertain and likely lower today than it was two years ago.

This is why we call it a dilemma. In this instance, the shareholder always loses something. The best evidence that both options—selling or staying—are defensible lies within ECR's own Board of Directors. The Board officially rejected the bid based on the impeccable argument of ECR's higher intrinsic value, yet two highly significant dissenting votes view the offer as a reasonable price to avoid the enormous risk of a total price collapse.

Rationally, from an investor's perspective, everything points toward it being more prudent to accept the offer. The risk of a sharp decline in the share price is far more certain than the potential upside from a cyclical recovery and a return to "mid-cycle" EBITDA levels—something that Lighthouse does not currently project until beyond 2028.

And yet... the option to decline the offer is not indefensible. From a strict market standpoint, it may not be the rational choice, but that is not the only perspective. One could bet that the company's fundamental value—and specifically the uniqueness of its assets—will eventually result in a better offer in the future, perhaps even from Bondalti itself, for whom ECR is a "rare find."

You can choose not to sell, but you must assume all the "tolls": the short-term share price drop, the possibility of an even more prolonged trough leading to continued negative FCF generation, increased leverage (and already high financial risk), and the absence of a dividend. If you can accept all of that, then in this dilemma, the option to hold is possible—and truly defensible.

A thorny dilemma.

## Valuation inputs

### Inputs for the DCF Valuation Approach

	2026e	2027e	2028e	Terminal Value <sup>(1)</sup>			
Free Cash Flow "To the Firm"	(21.5)	(12.6)	3.8	n.a.			
Market Cap	295.3	At the date of this report					
Net financial debt	112.9	Debt net of Cash (12m Results 2025)					
					Best Case	Worst Case	
Cost of Debt	5.8%	Net debt cost			5.5%	6.0%	
Tax rate (T)	20.0%	T (Normalised tax rate)			=	=	
Net debt cost	4.6%	Kd = Cost of Net Debt * (1-T)			4.4%	4.8%	
Risk free rate (rf)	3.1%	Rf (10y Spanish bond yield)			=	=	
Equity risk premium	6.0%	R (own estimate)			5.5%	6.5%	
Beta (B)	1.3	B (own estimate)			1.2	1.3	
Cost of Equity	10.9%	Ke = Rf + (R * B)			9.7%	11.5%	
Equity / (Equity + Net Debt)	72.3%	E (Market Cap as equity value)			=	=	
Net Debt / (Equity + Net Debt)	27.7%	D			=	=	
WACC	9.1%	WACC = Kd * D + Ke * E			8.2%	9.7%	
G "Fair"	1.5%				2.0%	1.0%	

(1) The terminal value calculated beyond the last FCF estimate does not reflect the company's growth potential (positive/negative) at the date of publication of this report.

### Inputs for the Multiples Valuation Approach

Company	Ticker Factset	Mkt. Cap	P/E 26e	EPS 26e-28e	EV/EBITDA 26e	EBITDA 26e-28e	EV/Sales 26e	Revenues 26e-28e	EBITDA/Sales 26e	FCF Yield 26e	FCF 26e-28e
BASF	BASFn.DE	43,066.6	18.8	18.7%	9.0	8.1%	1.1	3.6%	11.9%	4.9%	18.8%
Solvay	SOLB.BR	2,930.9	10.2	11.2%	5.7	6.2%	1.1	1.7%	18.6%	7.9%	19.2%
PCC Rokita	PCR.WA	331.7	10.6	-41.4%	5.3	7.1%	0.9	3.1%	16.9%	0.0%	n.a.
Europe			13.2	-3.8%	6.6	7.1%	1.0	2.8%	15.8%	4.3%	19.0%
DowDuPont	DOW	18,720.1	n.a.	n.a.	10.5	19.9%	1.0	3.6%	9.2%	2.4%	19.7%
Olin Corp	OLN	2,440.5	n.a.	94.1%	10.7	29.5%	0.8	2.7%	7.7%	4.9%	67.8%
Westlake	WLK	11,410.5	n.a.	n.a.	10.8	15.3%	1.5	4.4%	13.5%	2.4%	41.2%
Chemtrade Logistics	CHE_u.TO	1,082.6	11.5	7.3%	6.0	5.1%	1.4	-41.4%	22.7%	8.2%	-41.4%
North America			11.5	50.7%	9.5	17.4%	1.2	-7.7%	13.3%	4.4%	21.8%
ECR	ECR.MC	295.3	n.a.	42.2%	24.8	75.6%	0.6	10.5%	2.6%	n.a.	46.3%

### Free Cash Flow sensitivity analysis (2027e)

#### A) Rec. EBITDA and EV/EBITDA sensitivity to changes in EBITDA/Sales

Scenario	EBITDA/Sales 27e	EBITDA 27e	EV/EBITDA 27e
Max	4.2%	30.3	13.9x
Central	4.0%	28.8	14.6x
Min	3.8%	27.4	15.3x

#### B) Rec. FCF sensitivity to changes in EBITDA and CAPEX/sales

Rec. FCF EUR Mn	CAPEX/Sales 27e		
EBITDA 27e	3.8%	4.2%	4.6%
30.3	(25.9)	(28.7)	(31.6)
28.8	(27.3)	(30.2)	(33.0)
27.4	(28.7)	(31.6)	(34.4)


## Appendix 1. Financial Projections

<b>Balance Sheet (EUR Mn)</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026e</b>	<b>2027e</b>	<b>2028e</b>	<b>CAGR</b>	
Intangible assets	17.7	31.3	29.2	30.7	33.2	35.1	37.0	38.9		
Fixed assets	324.5	341.5	345.1	343.6	345.6	349.2	352.5	355.4		
Other Non Current Assets	35.7	34.4	40.6	41.5	28.1	35.6	40.9	40.9		
Financial Investments	29.0	39.2	57.0	55.8	39.9	41.1	42.3	43.4		
Goodwill & Other Intangibles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Current assets	248.9	239.9	170.2	188.9	149.4	150.1	162.1	183.2		
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>655.8</b>	<b>686.2</b>	<b>642.1</b>	<b>660.4</b>	<b>596.2</b>	<b>611.1</b>	<b>634.7</b>	<b>661.8</b>		
Equity	331.6	360.7	363.1	341.2	287.2	264.6	249.0	249.5		
Minority Interests	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Provisions & Other L/T Liabilities	67.6	86.6	83.6	75.7	71.4	71.4	71.4	71.4		
Other Non Current Liabilities	6.2	12.3	9.3	14.0	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.1		
Net financial debt	59.6	62.8	80.8	119.6	112.9	150.0	180.1	190.8		
Current Liabilities	190.8	163.8	105.3	110.0	112.6	113.1	122.1	138.0		
<b>Equity &amp; Total Liabilities</b>	<b>655.8</b>	<b>686.2</b>	<b>642.1</b>	<b>660.4</b>	<b>596.2</b>	<b>611.1</b>	<b>634.7</b>	<b>661.8</b>		
<b>P&amp;L (EUR Mn)</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026e</b>	<b>2027e</b>	<b>2028e</b>	<b>CAGR</b>	
<b>Total Revenues</b>	<b>811.8</b>	<b>1,052.5</b>	<b>755.4</b>	<b>692.8</b>	<b>659.9</b>	<b>662.8</b>	<b>715.7</b>	<b>808.9</b>	<b>21-25</b>	<b>25-28e</b>
<i>Total Revenues growth</i>	<i>40.1%</i>	<i>29.6%</i>	<i>-28.2%</i>	<i>-8.3%</i>	<i>-4.8%</i>	<i>0.4%</i>	<i>8.0%</i>	<i>13.0%</i>	<i>-5.0%</i>	<i>7.0%</i>
COGS	(525.5)	(692.6)	(494.7)	(442.8)	(428.7)	(419.7)	(454.0)	(515.0)		
<b>Gross Margin</b>	<b>286.3</b>	<b>359.9</b>	<b>260.8</b>	<b>250.0</b>	<b>231.2</b>	<b>243.1</b>	<b>261.7</b>	<b>293.9</b>	<b>-5.2%</b>	<b>8.3%</b>
<i>Gross Margin/Revenues</i>	<i>35.3%</i>	<i>34.2%</i>	<i>34.5%</i>	<i>36.1%</i>	<i>35.0%</i>	<i>36.7%</i>	<i>36.6%</i>	<i>36.3%</i>		
Personnel Expenses	(83.6)	(89.6)	(91.6)	(101.0)	(104.7)	(104.8)	(107.9)	(111.2)		
Other Operating Expenses	(109.4)	(128.2)	(122.0)	(121.2)	(120.5)	(121.3)	(124.9)	(130.5)		
<b>Recurrent EBITDA</b>	<b>93.3</b>	<b>142.1</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>-49.8%</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
<i>Recurrent EBITDA growth</i>	<i>93.4%</i>	<i>52.3%</i>	<i>-66.8%</i>	<i>-40.9%</i>	<i>-78.7%</i>	<i>185.8%</i>	<i>70.1%</i>	<i>81.3%</i>		
<i>Rec. EBITDA/Revenues</i>	<i>11.5%</i>	<i>13.5%</i>	<i>6.2%</i>	<i>4.0%</i>	<i>0.9%</i>	<i>2.6%</i>	<i>4.0%</i>	<i>6.5%</i>		
Restructuring Expense & Other non-rec.	(0.4)	(20.2)	(3.8)	0.8	(1.6)	-	-	-		
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>92.9</b>	<b>121.9</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>28.6</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>-53.4%</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
Depreciation & Provisions	(25.2)	(23.4)	(23.5)	(24.9)	(26.3)	(26.4)	(26.7)	(27.1)		
Capitalized Expense	0.5	0.8	1.0	0.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9		
Rentals (IFRS 16 impact)	(6.3)	(7.1)	(7.8)	(7.7)	(8.1)	(8.3)	(8.4)	(8.6)		
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>92.2</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>(3.1)</b>	<b>(28.1)</b>	<b>(15.8)</b>	<b>(4.5)</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>-25.2%</b>	<b>38.5%</b>
<i>EBIT growth</i>	<i>314.0%</i>	<i>49.0%</i>	<i>-85.9%</i>	<i>-124.1%</i>	<i>-796.5%</i>	<i>43.8%</i>	<i>71.8%</i>	<i>513.7%</i>		
<i>EBIT/Revenues</i>	<i>7.6%</i>	<i>8.8%</i>	<i>1.7%</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>2.3%</i>		
Impact of Goodwill & Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Net Financial Result	(3.1)	(5.1)	(9.6)	(10.7)	(13.3)	(15.6)	(17.6)	(18.9)		
Income by the Equity Method	0.6	0.9	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2		
<b>Ordinary Profit</b>	<b>59.3</b>	<b>88.0</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>(12.3)</b>	<b>(40.3)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(20.8)</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>-27.9%</b>	<b>26.3%</b>
<i>Ordinary Profit Growth</i>	<i>749.1%</i>	<i>48.3%</i>	<i>-94.3%</i>	<i>-343.5%</i>	<i>-228.6%</i>	<i>25.0%</i>	<i>31.0%</i>	<i>103.2%</i>		
Extraordinary Results	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
<b>Profit Before Tax</b>	<b>59.3</b>	<b>88.0</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>(12.3)</b>	<b>(40.3)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(20.8)</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>-27.9%</b>	<b>26.3%</b>
Tax Expense	(9.9)	(17.3)	23.8	0.6	(13.3)	7.5	5.2	(0.2)		
<i>Effective Tax Rate</i>	<i>16.7%</i>	<i>19.7%</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>25.0%</i>		
Minority Interests	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Discontinued Activities	(6.1)	(7.7)	(1.2)	-	-	-	-	-		
<b>Net Profit</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>(11.7)</b>	<b>(53.6)</b>	<b>(22.6)</b>	<b>(15.6)</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>-34.1%</b>	<b>26.2%</b>
<i>Net Profit growth</i>	<i>592.0%</i>	<i>45.5%</i>	<i>-56.2%</i>	<i>-142.3%</i>	<i>-359.7%</i>	<i>57.7%</i>	<i>31.0%</i>	<i>103.2%</i>		
<b>Ordinary Net Profit</b>	<b>49.7</b>	<b>86.9</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>(13.0)</b>	<b>(38.7)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(20.8)</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>-29.1%</b>	<b>26.3%</b>
<i>Ordinary Net Profit growth</i>	<i>603.6%</i>	<i>74.7%</i>	<i>-89.8%</i>	<i>-247.2%</i>	<i>-197.7%</i>	<i>22.0%</i>	<i>31.0%</i>	<i>102.4%</i>		
<b>Cash Flow (EUR Mn)</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>	<b>2026e</b>	<b>2027e</b>	<b>2028e</b>	<b>CAGR</b>	
<b>Recurrent EBITDA</b>						<b>16.9</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>-49.8%</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
Rentals (IFRS 16 impact)						(8.3)	(8.4)	(8.6)		
Working Capital Increase						(0.2)	(3.0)	(5.2)		
<b>Recurrent Operating Cash Flow</b>						<b>8.5</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b>-9.2%</b>	<b>-1.2%</b>
CAPEX						(30.0)	(30.0)	(30.0)		
Net Financial Result affecting the Cash Flow						(15.6)	(17.6)	(18.9)		
Tax Expense						-	-	(0.2)		
<b>Recurrent Free Cash Flow</b>						<b>(37.1)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(10.7)</b>	<b>-28.8%</b>	<b>-33.1%</b>
Restructuring Expense & Other non-rec.						-	-	-		
- Acquisitions / + Divestures of assets						-	-	-		
Extraordinary Inc./Exp. Affecting Cash Flow						-	-	-		
<b>Free Cash Flow</b>						<b>(37.1)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(10.7)</b>	<b>-26.2%</b>	<b>-53.2%</b>
Capital Increase						-	-	-		
Dividends						-	-	-		
<b>Net Debt Variation</b>						<b>37.1</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>10.7</b>		


## Appendix 2. Free Cash Flow

A) Cash Flow Analysis (EUR Mn)	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e	CAGR	
								22-25	25-28e
<b>Recurrent EBITDA</b>	<b>142.1</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>-65.3%</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
<i>Recurrent EBITDA growth</i>	52.3%	-66.8%	-40.9%	-78.7%	185.8%	70.1%	81.3%		
<i>Rec. EBITDA/Revenues</i>	13.5%	6.2%	4.0%	0.9%	2.6%	4.0%	6.5%		
- Rentals (IFRS 16 impact)	(7.1)	(7.8)	(7.7)	(8.1)	(8.3)	(8.4)	(8.6)		
+/- Working Capital increase	(18.0)	11.2	(14.0)	42.0	(0.2)	(3.0)	(5.2)		
<b>= Recurrent Operating Cash Flow</b>	<b>117.0</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b>-30.2%</b>	<b>-1.2%</b>
<i>Rec. Operating Cash Flow growth</i>	99.4%	-56.8%	-87.8%	543.1%	-78.6%	104.9%	120.6%		
<i>Rec. Operating Cash Flow / Sales</i>	11.1%	6.7%	0.9%	6.0%	1.3%	2.4%	4.8%		
- CAPEX	(53.2)	(24.0)	(26.6)	(29.2)	(30.0)	(30.0)	(30.0)		
- Net Financial Result affecting Cash Flow	(5.1)	(9.6)	(8.3)	(11.8)	(15.6)	(17.6)	(18.9)		
- Taxes	(17.3)	(5.3)	(1.7)	(3.4)	-	-	(0.2)		
<b>= Recurrent Free Cash Flow</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>(30.4)</b>	<b>(4.5)</b>	<b>(37.1)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(10.7)</b>	<b>-28.2%</b>	<b>-33.1%</b>
<i>Rec. Free Cash Flow growth</i>	585.0%	-71.7%	-358.9%	85.1%	-719.1%	18.6%	64.6%		
<i>Rec. Free Cash Flow / Revenues</i>	3.9%	1.6%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		
- Restructuring expenses & others	-	(3.8)	0.8	(1.6)	-	-	-		
- Acquisitions / + Divestments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
+/- Extraordinary Inc./Exp. affecting Cash Flow	(22.0)	(1.2)	1.3	12.8	-	-	-		
<b>= Free Cash Flow</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>(28.4)</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>(37.1)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(10.7)</b>	<b>-29.9%</b>	<b>-53.2%</b>
<i>Free Cash Flow growth</i>	-14.0%	-65.4%	-521.5%	123.6%	-653.3%	18.6%	64.6%		
<i>Recurrent Free Cash Flow - Yield (s/Mkt Cap)</i>	14.0%	4.0%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		
<i>Free Cash Flow Yield (s/Mkt Cap)</i>	6.6%	2.3%	n.a.	2.3%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		
<b>B) Analytical Review of Annual Recurrent Free Cash Flow Performance (Eur Mn)</b>									
<b>Recurrent FCF(FY - 1)</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>(30.4)</b>	<b>(4.5)</b>	<b>(37.1)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>		
EBITDA impact from revenue increase	27.7	(40.1)	(3.9)	(1.3)	0.0	1.4	3.8		
EBITDA impact from EBITDA/Sales variation	21.1	(54.9)	(15.4)	(20.6)	11.0	10.5	19.7		
<b>= Recurrent EBITDA variation</b>	<b>48.8</b>	<b>(95.0)</b>	<b>(19.3)</b>	<b>(21.9)</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>23.4</b>		
- Rentals (IFRS 16 impact) variation impact	(0.8)	(0.6)	0.1	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)		
+/- Working capital variation impact	10.3	29.2	(25.2)	56.0	(42.2)	(2.8)	(2.2)		
<b>= Recurrent Operating Cash Flow variation</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>(66.4)</b>	<b>(44.4)</b>	<b>33.6</b>	<b>(31.3)</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>21.0</b>		
+/- CAPEX impact	(13.6)	29.2	(2.6)	(2.5)	(0.9)	-	-		
+/- Financial result variation	(1.9)	(4.5)	1.3	(3.5)	(3.8)	(2.0)	(1.4)		
+/- Tax impact	(7.4)	12.0	3.6	(1.7)	3.4	-	(0.2)		
<b>= Recurrent Free Cash Flow variation</b>	<b>35.4</b>	<b>(29.7)</b>	<b>(42.1)</b>	<b>25.9</b>	<b>(32.5)</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>19.5</b>		
<b>Recurrent Free Cash Flow</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>(30.4)</b>	<b>(4.5)</b>	<b>(37.1)</b>	<b>(30.2)</b>	<b>(10.7)</b>		
<b>C) "FCF to the Firm" (pre debt service) (EUR Mn)</b>									
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>92.2</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>(3.1)</b>	<b>(28.1)</b>	<b>(15.8)</b>	<b>(4.5)</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>-32.1%</b>	<b>38.5%</b>
* Theoretical Tax rate	19.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%		
= Taxes (pre- Net Financial Result)	(18.1)	-	-	-	-	-	(4.6)		
<b>Recurrent EBITDA</b>	<b>142.1</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>-65.3%</b>	<b>n.a.</b>
- Rentals (IFRS 16 impact)	(7.1)	(7.8)	(7.7)	(8.1)	(8.3)	(8.4)	(8.6)		
+/- Working Capital increase	(18.0)	11.2	(14.0)	42.0	(0.2)	(3.0)	(5.2)		
<b>= Recurrent Operating Cash Flow</b>	<b>117.0</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b>-30.2%</b>	<b>-1.2%</b>
- CAPEX	(53.2)	(24.0)	(26.6)	(29.2)	(30.0)	(30.0)	(30.0)		
- Taxes (pre- Financial Result)	(18.1)	-	-	-	-	-	(4.6)		
<b>= Recurrent Free Cash Flow (To the Firm)</b>	<b>45.7</b>	<b>26.6</b>	<b>(20.4)</b>	<b>10.7</b>	<b>(21.5)</b>	<b>(12.6)</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>-38.4%</b>	<b>-29.0%</b>
<i>Rec. Free Cash Flow (To the Firm) growth</i>	421.5%	-41.8%	-176.9%	152.2%	-301.3%	41.5%	130.5%		
<i>Rec. Free Cash Flow (To the Firm) / Revenues</i>	4.3%	3.5%	n.a.	1.6%	n.a.	n.a.	0.5%		
- Restructuring expenses & others	-	(3.8)	0.8	(1.6)	-	-	-		
- Acquisitions / + Divestments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
+/- Extraordinary Inc./Exp. affecting Cash Flow	(22.0)	(1.2)	1.3	12.8	-	-	-		
<b>= Free Cash Flow "To the Firm"</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>(18.4)</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>(21.5)</b>	<b>(12.6)</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>-2.6%</b>	<b>-44.1%</b>
<i>Free Cash Flow (To the Firm) growth</i>	-6.5%	-8.9%	-185.4%	218.9%	-198.2%	41.5%	130.5%		
<i>Rec. Free Cash Flow To the Firm Yield (o/EV)</i>	10.9%	6.3%	n.a.	2.5%	n.a.	n.a.	0.9%		
<i>Free Cash Flow "To the Firm" - Yield (o/EV)</i>	5.6%	5.1%	n.a.	5.2%	n.a.	n.a.	0.9%		

**Recurrent Free Cash Flow accumulated variation analysis (2021 - 2025)**



**Recurrent Free Cash Flow accumulated variation analysis (2025 - 2028e)**



**Recurrent EBITDA vs Recurrent Free Cash Flow**



**Stock performance vs EBITDA 12m forward**



**Appendix 3. EV breakdown at the date of this report**

	EUR Mn	Source
Market Cap	295.3	
+ Minority Interests	-	12m Results 2025
+ Provisions & Other L/T Liabilities	21.9	12m Results 2025
+ Net financial debt	112.9	12m Results 2025
- Financial Investments	10.5	12m Results 2025
+/- Others		
<b>Enterprise Value (EV)</b>	<b>419.6</b>	

## Appendix 4. Historical performance <sup>(1)</sup>

Historical performance (EUR Mn)																CAGR	
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026e	2027e	2028e	15-25	25-28e	
Total Revenues	624.5	606.9	689.3	677.1	682.3	579.3	811.8	1,052.5	755.4	692.8	659.9	662.8	715.7	808.9	0.6%	7.0%	
Total Revenues growth	2.8%	-2.8%	13.6%	-1.8%	0.8%	-15.1%	40.1%	29.6%	-28.2%	-8.3%	-4.8%	0.4%	8.0%	13.0%			
EBITDA	32.5	58.2	52.6	62.8	56.8	47.3	92.9	121.9	43.3	28.6	4.4	16.9	28.8	52.3	-18.2%	n.a.	
EBITDA growth	125.5%	79.0%	-9.7%	19.4%	-9.4%	-16.7%	96.3%	31.2%	-64.5%	-34.0%	-84.7%	287.4%	70.1%	81.3%			
EBITDA/Sales	5.2%	9.6%	7.6%	9.3%	8.3%	8.2%	11.4%	11.6%	5.7%	4.1%	0.7%	2.6%	4.0%	6.5%			
Net Profit	7.2	45.2	44.5	44.9	31.0	6.3	43.3	63.0	27.6	(11.7)	(53.6)	(22.6)	(15.6)	0.5	-25.1%	26.2%	
Net Profit growth	215.1%	523.8%	-1.5%	0.9%	-30.8%	-79.8%	592.0%	45.5%	-56.2%	-142.3%	-359.7%	57.7%	31.0%	103.2%			
Adjusted number shares (Mn)	114.0	114.1	112.3	109.2	102.6	102.6	101.0	98.4	93.6	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.4			
EPS (EUR)	0.06	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.29	0.06	0.43	0.64	0.29	-0.13	-0.59	-0.25	-0.17	0.01	-27.4%	26.2%	
EPS growth	n.a.	n.a.	0.1%	3.7%	-28.9%	-79.1%	n.a.	49.3%	-53.9%	n.a.	n.a.	57.7%	31.0%	n.a.			
Ord. EPS (EUR)	0.06	0.40	0.64	0.43	0.32	0.07	0.49	0.88	0.09	-0.14	-0.42	-0.33	-0.23	0.01	-24.1%	26.3%	
Ord. EPS growth	n.a.	n.a.	62.3%	-33.5%	-24.2%	-78.8%	n.a.	79.2%	-89.3%	n.a.	n.a.	22.0%	31.0%	n.a.			
CAPEX	(10.4)	(20.6)	(36.6)	(32.0)	(55.0)	(35.8)	(39.6)	(53.2)	(24.0)	(26.6)	(29.2)	(30.0)	(30.0)	(30.0)			
CAPEX/Sales %	1.7%	3.4%	5.3%	4.7%	8.1%	6.2%	4.9%	5.1%	3.2%	3.8%	4.4%	4.5%	4.2%	3.7%			
Free Cash Flow	8.8	47.4	18.6	3.2	26.1	35.2	22.6	19.4	6.7	(28.4)	6.7	(37.1)	(30.2)	(10.7)	-2.7%	-53.2%	
ND/EBITDA (x) <sup>(2)</sup>	3.7x	1.3x	1.7x	1.7x	1.7x	1.6x	0.6x	0.5x	1.9x	4.2x	25.8x	8.8x	6.2x	3.7x			
P/E (x)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	10.4x	10.2x	11.7x	n.a.	4.0x	11.0x	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.			
EV/Sales (x)	0.30x	0.51x	0.61x	0.70x	0.57x	0.53x	0.45x	0.36x	0.44x	0.66x	0.66x	0.63x	0.59x	0.52x			
EV/EBITDA (x) <sup>(2)</sup>	5.8x	5.3x	8.0x	7.5x	6.9x	6.5x	3.9x	3.1x	7.7x	16.0x	n.a.	24.8x	14.6x	8.0x			
Absolute performance	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-30.3%	-76.1%	-13.7%	315.6%	26.6%	9.0%	-3.0%	-5.7%					
Relative performance vs Ibx 35	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-44.3%	-78.0%	-10.9%	315.4%	46.9%	-22.7%	-35.0%	-11.1%					

Note 1: The multiples are historical, calculated based on the price and EV at the end of each year, except (if applicable) in the current year, when multiples would be given at current prices. The absolute and relative behavior corresponds to each exercise (1/1 to 31/12). The source, both historical multiples and the evolution of the price, is Refinitiv.

Note 2: All ratios and multiples on EBITDA refer to total EBITDA (not to recurrent EBITDA).

## Appendix 5. Main peers 2026e

		Europe				North America				Chemtrade Logistics	
EUR Mn		BASF	Solvay	PCC Rokita	Average	DowDuPont	Olin Corp	Westlake	Income Fund	Average	ECR
Market data	Ticker (Factset)	BASFn.DE	SOLB.BR	PCR.WA		DOW	OLN	WLK	CHE_u.TO		ECR.MC
	Country	Germany	Belgium	Poland		USA	USA	USA	Canada		Spain
	Market cap	43,066.6	2,930.9	331.7		18,720.1	2,440.5	11,410.5	1,082.6		295.3
	Enterprise value (EV)	64,599.5	4,626.9	440.8		32,238.6	4,718.9	14,108.4	1,806.8		419.6
Basic financial information	Total Revenues	60,251.9	4,392.0	495.6		33,488.8	5,771.3	9,659.3	1,326.0		662.8
	Total Revenues growth	1.8%	-7.5%	5.9%	0.1%	-1.3%	0.5%	2.2%	7.0%	2.1%	0.4%
	2y CAGR (2026e - 2028e)	3.6%	1.7%	3.1%	2.8%	3.6%	2.7%	4.4%	-41.4%	-7.7%	10.5%
	EBITDA	7,162.7	818.2	83.7		3,068.3	442.8	1,305.8	301.3		16.9
	EBITDA growth	7.6%	-6.4%	13.7%	5.0%	13.6%	-10.6%	59.5%	-7.3%	13.8%	287.4%
	2y CAGR (2026e - 2028e)	8.1%	6.2%	7.1%	7.1%	19.9%	29.5%	15.3%	5.1%	17.4%	75.6%
	EBITDA/Revenues	11.9%	18.6%	16.9%	15.8%	9.2%	7.7%	13.5%	22.7%	13.3%	2.6%
	EBIT	3,133.6	500.5	44.6		660.9	30.8	276.4	176.4		(15.8)
	EBIT growth	n.a.	n.a.	38.7%	38.7%	123.7%	-73.7%	n.a.	n.a.	25.0%	43.8%
	2y CAGR (2026e - 2028e)	15.9%	7.2%	13.5%	12.2%	68.8%	n.a.	57.4%	-41.4%	28.3%	77.9%
	EBIT/Revenues	5.2%	11.4%	9.0%	8.5%	2.0%	0.5%	2.9%	13.3%	4.7%	n.a.
	Net Profit	2,190.3	286.1	30.8		(228.2)	(67.7)	129.5	99.8		(22.6)
	Net Profit growth	43.4%	673.3%	51.7%	256.1%	89.0%	20.9%	110.4%	15.3%	58.9%	57.7%
2y CAGR (2026e - 2028e)	15.1%	8.8%	15.7%	13.2%	n.a.	n.a.	82.2%	-41.4%	20.4%	42.2%	
CAPEX/Sales %	6.5%	6.5%	5.7%	6.2%	6.2%	2.9%	7.9%	7.4%	6.1%	4.5%	
Free Cash Flow	2,110.9	230.5	n.a.		440.5	118.7	269.9	88.7		(37.1)	
Net financial debt	16,495.8	1,756.0	57.5		12,271.1	2,216.5	2,050.1	708.0		150.0	
ND/EBITDA (x)	2.3	2.1	0.7	1.7	4.0	5.0	1.6	2.4	3.2	8.8	
Pay-out	94.8%	85.7%	44.9%	75.1%	-369.1%	-115.1%	186.1%	62.8%	-58.8%	0.0%	
Multiples and Ratios	P/E (x)	18.8	10.2	10.6	13.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11.5	11.5	n.a.
	P/BV (x)	1.2	2.5	0.9	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.2	2.3	1.7	1.1
	EV/Revenues (x)	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.5	1.4	1.2	0.6
	EV/EBITDA (x)	9.0	5.7	5.3	6.6	10.5	10.7	10.8	6.0	9.5	24.8
	EV/EBIT (x)	20.6	9.2	9.9	13.2	48.8	n.a.	n.a.	10.2	29.5	n.a.
	ROE	7.3	22.6	9.2	13.0	n.a.	n.a.	1.6	23.0	12.3	n.a.
	FCF Yield (%)	4.9	7.9	n.a.	6.4	2.4	4.9	2.4	8.2	4.4	n.a.
	DPS	2.33	2.35	0.70	1.79	1.18	0.68	1.88	0.55	1.07	0.00
Dvd Yield	4.8%	8.5%	4.2%	5.8%	4.5%	3.2%	2.1%	5.7%	3.9%	0.0%	

Note 1: Financial data, multiples and ratios based on market consensus (Refinitiv). In the case of the company analyzed, own estimates (Lighthouse).

Note 2: All ratios and multiples on EBITDA refer to total EBITDA (not to recurrent EBITDA).

## LIGHTHOUSE

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## Notes and Reports History

Date of report	Recommendation	Price (EUR)	Target price (EUR)	Period of validity	Reason for report	Analyst
02-Mar-2026	n.a.	3.23	n.a.	n.a.	12m Results 2025	Pablo Victoria Rivera, CESGA
11-Nov-2025	n.a.	3.08	n.a.	n.a.	9m Results 2025	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
03-Nov-2025	n.a.	3.20	n.a.	n.a.	Important news	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
12-Aug-2025	n.a.	2.64	n.a.	n.a.	Important news	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
29-Jul-2025	n.a.	3.08	n.a.	n.a.	6m Results 2025	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
17-Jun-2025	n.a.	3.06	n.a.	n.a.	Small & Micro Caps (Spain)	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
13-May-2025	n.a.	3.05	n.a.	n.a.	3m Results 2025	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
26-Feb-2025	n.a.	3.04	n.a.	n.a.	12m Results 2024	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
07-Nov-2024	n.a.	3.62	n.a.	n.a.	9m Results 2024	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
30-Jul-2024	n.a.	3.88	n.a.	n.a.	6m Results 2024 - Estimates downgrade	Enrique Andrés Abad, CFA
28-Jun-2024	n.a.	3.49	n.a.	n.a.	Important news	Enrique Andrés Abad, CFA
27-May-2024	n.a.	3.50	n.a.	n.a.	Small & Micro Caps (Spain)	Alfredo Echevarría Otegui
30-Apr-2024	n.a.	3.52	n.a.	n.a.	3m Results 2024	Enrique Andrés Abad, CFA
08-Mar-2024	n.a.	3.42	n.a.	n.a.	Important news	Enrique Andrés Abad, CFA
29-Feb-2024	n.a.	2.41	n.a.	n.a.	12m Results 2023	Enrique Andrés Abad, CFA
08-Nov-2023	n.a.	2.85	n.a.	n.a.	9m Results 2023 - Estimates downgrade	Enrique Andrés Abad, CFA
27-Jul-2023	n.a.	3.22	n.a.	n.a.	6m Results 2023	Enrique Andrés Abad, CFA
14-Jun-2023	n.a.	3.35	n.a.	n.a.	Important news - Estimates downgrade	David López Sánchez
12-Jun-2023	n.a.	3.32	n.a.	n.a.	Small & Micro Caps (Spain)	David López Sánchez
03-May-2023	n.a.	4.20	n.a.	n.a.	3m Results 2023	David López Sánchez
11-Apr-2023	n.a.	4.48	n.a.	n.a.	Review of estimates	David López Sánchez
22-Feb-2023	n.a.	3.96	n.a.	n.a.	12m Results 2022	David López Sánchez
09-Nov-2022	n.a.	3.31	n.a.	n.a.	9m Results 2022	David López Sánchez
03-Aug-2022	n.a.	3.46	n.a.	n.a.	6m Results 2022	David López Sánchez
15-Jun-2022	n.a.	3.37	n.a.	n.a.	Estimates upgrade	David López Sánchez
04-May-2022	n.a.	3.38	n.a.	n.a.	3m Results 2022	David López Sánchez
25-Feb-2022	n.a.	3.02	n.a.	n.a.	12m Results 2021	David López Sánchez
10-Nov-2021	n.a.	3.52	n.a.	n.a.	9m Results 2021	David López Sánchez
29-Jul-2021	n.a.	3.36	n.a.	n.a.	6m Results 2021 - Estimates upgrade	David López Sánchez
12-May-2021	n.a.	3.16	n.a.	n.a.	3m Results 2021 - Estimates upgrade	David López Sánchez
26-Feb-2021	n.a.	2.41	n.a.	n.a.	12m Results 2020	David López Sánchez
16-Nov-2020	n.a.	2.01	n.a.	n.a.	9m Results 2020	David López Sánchez
03-Aug-2020	n.a.	1.73	n.a.	n.a.	6m Results 2020 - Estimates upgrade	David López Sánchez
15-May-2020	n.a.	1.95	n.a.	n.a.	3m Results 2020	David López Sánchez
30-Apr-2020	n.a.	2.66	n.a.	n.a.	Estimates downgrade	David López Sánchez
02-Mar-2020	n.a.	2.28	n.a.	n.a.	12m Results 2019	David López Sánchez
06-Nov-2019	n.a.	2.42	n.a.	n.a.	9m Results 2019 - Estimates upgrade	David López Sánchez
29-Jul-2019	n.a.	1.92	n.a.	n.a.	6m Results 2019	David López Sánchez
03-Jun-2019	n.a.	2.22	n.a.	n.a.	Initiation of Coverage	David López Sánchez

